February 2004 Mfg.Trust

Mfg.Trust is a monthly feature of the
            NCMS InfraGard Manufacturing Industry Association
                        Infrastructure assurance for manufacturers
                                    Powered by NCMS.

This month – Unseen Dangers in Offshore IT Outsourcing?
Due Diligence Demanded


Editor's Preface:

This month’s article focuses on the potential for inadequate security surrounding the booming offshore outsourcing trend. Over half of the Fortune 500 companies send billions of dollars overseas to pay for outsourced software development and business processing in low-wage countries like the Philippines, China, and India. The driving force is the pursuit of instant price advantages through “globalizing production.” However, rising security risks for customers, corporate stakeholders, and U.S. national security are often overlooked.

To examine the issue, read on. We are indebted to Tom Cocchiarella and Rob Ramer for the material for this month’s article. Tom Cocchiarella has served as the FBI’s InfraGard Delegate for the Minnesota Chapter since 2001, and is a Sr. Director for Architecture and Technology for one of Minnesota’s largest health care organizations. Rob Ramer is the founder of TerraFirma Security, a St. Paul based company that specializes in outsourcing risk mitigation and has offices in Bombay, India and Singapore.

As always, our Resources Section at http://trust.ncms.org contains a rich set of links for further reading.

Editor


UNSEEN DANGERS IN OFFSHORE IT OUTSOURCING?

Overview

In August 2002, an FBI sting operation in New Delhi recovered stolen source code from a developer who had been fired by his Bombay software outsourcing employer. Now, a court in India will have to decide if any charges can be brought to prevent theft of intellectual property from a U.S. client. Currently, India does not recognize trade theft.

From phone operators who answer questions about US citizen’s Visa accounts, to programmers who maintain computer operations for U.S. based Airlines - IT workers a half-world away are directly involved in our daily lives. Railroads, power companies, and defense contractors regularly use global outsourcing to cut costs and deliver services to their clients. A network of software development centers, data operations centers, and business-processing centers stretch around the globe, located in countries including China, Vietnam, Russia, India, Ireland and Spain. This scenario has become part of today’s global economy; one driven by modern global economics that realistically cannot be changed.

We do believe attention is needed concerning the increased risk of criminal attacks against our critical infrastructures via these offshore centers. This is important, because U.S. laws do not govern these offshore operations, nor are they operated under generally accepted American business standards.


Computer Services Outsourcing

Computer offshore outsourcing itself often increases network vulnerabilities because a client American company is directly linked to a network it no longer has control over. (Offshore data links are often routed through a web of service providers, meaning that neither the outsourcing client nor the outsourcing vendor knows the actual path of the data.) System design information is often transmitted via unprotected email or discussed over open voice networks. This provides an opportunity for “observers” to learn about proprietary data, gather information on internal networks, or obtain code of new software systems being designed for a client company.

Unauthorized “hacker” access to software (designs and code) could, with malicious intent and relative ease, create blackouts, cause air or rail accidents, system shutdowns, or interfere with U.S. computer and communications systems. Yet, American defense and government contractors routinely outsource software development in order to reduce costs.


The Environment Overseas

A St. Paul based Security Auditing/Consulting Company spent the last year evaluating various data centers in India. They identified serious vulnerabilities in facilities in India and in the data links to the networks of major Twin Cities corporations. Vulnerabilities uncovered included: confidential data being transmitted unencrypted, the absence of back-ups, and poor physical security at various India based data centers.

U.S. corporations that outsource IT functionality overseas should realize that they remain legally responsible in the U.S. for any losses or consumer damages from the failure of outsourced systems. In addition, U.S. companies they may find they have little legal redress in the outsourced host country, either due to inadequate cyber statutes, or possibly to corruptible legal structures in some host countries.


What Can Be Done?

There are very specific actions a company can take to mitigate risks:

* Federal financial regulators have taken action to warn banks against various outsourcing risks. The Office of the Comptroller of Currency and other Federal agencies has issued guidance that emphasizes simple obligations: due diligence, active management of security issues, and repeated third party audits.

* BITS, a technology exchange group related to the Financial Services Roundtable (see Resources Page), has developed a systematic framework for assessing and managing IT outsourcing risks (see http://www.bitsinfo.org/serviceproviders.html).

* The Federal government, through the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) and InfraGard (a private/government FBI partnership organization dedicated to fighting cyber and physical threats against the nations Critical Infrastructures), has also taken notice of this issue. (see www.infragard.org)

We believe the U.S. government and private industry must both take much stronger and proactive leadership on this issue. The Government should lead in their own sectors – defense, intelligence, space, and the regulation of some critical infrastructure providers.

Privately owned organizations must pro-actively manage security of their outsource providers, and conduct regular security assessments using security firms based within their own country.

An estimated 85 percent of America’s critical infrastructure is owned by private, non-government businesses. Since our U.S. critical infrastructure is increasingly dependent on global IT systems, it is up to our government and corporations to take steps to insure that any offshore outsourcing is secure.


Conclusion

We must do more to protect our critical assets from cyber attacks. It is up to both government and industry to protect the computer systems that drive our critical infrastructures. The steps outlined by financial regulators are applicable to all outsourcing:

* perform due diligence for security on the outsourcer,
* provide constant and active management that includes accountability for reporting and redressing security vulnerabilities, and
* demand regular third-party security audits


LINKS

TerraFirma Security Inc.
Full text article by Rob Ramer and Tom Cocchiarella
http://www.tfsecurity.com/unseendangers.html


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National Center for Manufacturing Sciences